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‘Infrastructures of Responsibility’:
the Moral Tasks of Institutions
GARRATH WILLIAMS
 The members of any functioning modern society live their lives amid complex
networks of overlapping institutions. Apart from the major political institutions of law and
government, however, much normative political theory seems to regard this institutional fabric
as largely a pragmatic convenience. This paper contests this assumption by reflecting on how
institutions both constrain and enable spheres of effective action and responsibility. In this way
a society’s institutional fabric constitutes, in Samuel Scheffler’s phrase, an infrastructure of
responsibility.
The paper discusses three key normative aspects of this infrastructure. First, institutions
define roles and rules, alongside forms of sanction and encouragement, so as to realise limited
forms of practical, normative agreement. Second, institutions allocate and adjudicate distinct
responsibilities. This creates separate spheres of initiative, ensuring responsibilities are fulfilled
and providing for structured disagreement and change. Third, because we move through a
plurality of institutions and associations, we experience varying responsibilities and forms of
recognition. Individual identities thus depend on several different forms of recognition, and are
well placed to resist totalising or fundamentalist temptations. In sum, the paper argues that a
liberal institutional fabric provides essential moral stability, though not an undesirable fixity.
By containing the fragility and dangers of individual moral judgment, our institutional fabric
allows such judgment to play a valuable role in human affairs.
Introduction
Let me begin by asking to what experiences modern liberal thought responds. The
main currents can, I think, be captured in terms of three broad schools of thought.
Locke, and then the authors of The Federalist Papers, anticipate the growth of rights
claims against government, realised via divisions of powers and systematic representa-
tion of the governed. Secondly, classical or economic liberals such as Adam Smith
respond to the rise of market relations, again understood as a sphere that can effec-
tively limit governmental power. And third, modern egalitarian liberals such as Rawls
rely on the greatly increased powers of modern societies to provide for welfare and
protect rights. He and his critics engage with the complexities of democratic participa-
tion and huge difficulties posed by contested, competing values such as liberty and
equality. These topics have been taken up in many further ways, for instance by
republicanism, multiculturalism or feminism, which have stressed the space between
democratic rights and actual participation, between formal equality and lived experi-
ence. Finally, perhaps we might also add a fourth current, with its roots in Hobbes: the
‘liberalism of fear’ reminds us of what we stand to lose when liberal democracy fails.
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All these schools of thought clearly draw on very important experiences. But one
essential development seems to be omitted from this list, or any more detailed account.
As my title indicates, I believe this development can be captured in terms of the rise
and rise of institutions. Modern societies are constituted by an astonishingly dense
network of organisations — private and public, social and economic, charitable and
political, and so on.1 Naturally, contemporary liberals rely on this development to help
realise their normative aspirations. In this paper, however, I contend that this reliance
tends to be tacit, which means it can easily be ignored when it suggests complexities in
how we should conceive of modern liberalism. My positive concern is to understand
how the practices of responsibility essential to modern liberal societies are actually
constituted.
Three decades ago, Geoffrey Vickers observed ‘two familiar but staggering changes
of the last hundred years. One is the escalation of our expectations; the other is the
escalation of our institutions’. The term ‘institution’ describes here any organised
collectivity.2 We are familiar with an astonishingly wide range of such bodies: from
schools to audit commissions to law courts, from the private limited company to the
public corporation to the transnational company, from the local charitable hospice to
the tennis club to the lavishly endowed charitable trust. To remain with Vickers for a
moment longer:
. . . in Britain in the mid-nineteenth century trade unions were still criminal
conspiracies; the right to form corporations, especially business corporations,
was a jealously guarded privilege; and the central government had only one
rudimentary department concerned with any internal regulation beyond
justice, law and order. The huge edifice of our institutions, like the huge edifice
of our expectations, has been built within the lives of men alive today.3
We might say that modern liberal theory has had no difficulty keeping pace with our
escalating expectations — one might even think it has done its share in contributing to
these. However, it has not done such a good job as regards our escalating institutions,
so definitive of modern societies. Political and legal institutions are obviously import-
ant for liberal thought — as they have been for political theorists since Plato. But the
moral and political roles of institutions per se are much less regarded.4
Yet if we think about our modern expectations, it is not just political institutions or
the emergence of constitutional democracy that have satisfied and fuelled them. There
are at least two further conditions that have realised our enormous expectations, whether
those concern tolerance and social pluralism, the balancing of governmental powers,
economic growth or growth in individual opportunities. One condition is technological,
something that has been central to environmentalist political thought but has not been
especially important to liberalism. I too will put it to one side, in the belief that a
second condition has been far more decisive.
This second development goes right to the fundamentals of human interaction. A
whole set of interrelated innovations that we might call ‘technologies of organisation’
has transformed our social and political lives. Among these innovations, one might
mention division of labour, the invention and refinement of bureaucracy, the develop-
ment of modes of accountability, and massive legal innovations that accommodate
and foster various collective entities (not least, the limited company). In fact, these
organisational technologies have proved both a precondition of material technological
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innovation and its systematic deployment — and much more important than any given
material technology in developing and meeting our modern expectations.
At the heart of these historically novel technologies of organisation are freely adopted,
deliberately created roles — as Vickers says, ‘the greatest social invention of our culture’,5
albeit an invention we usually take for granted. These are roles that can be adopted
and renounced by individuals, roles whose occupants can be replaced, and roles which
can be deliberately designed or redesigned to meet particular needs or expectations.
This innovation belongs to both ‘private’ and ‘public’ sectors: it is a feature of govern-
mental bodies, charities, political parties, trades unions, commercial entities, the regula-
tory bodies that exist between government and market, and social organisations. (Total
institutions obviously pose special problems here — the role of prisoner, for instance,
is certainly not freely adopted. In fact, total institutions will also be problematic with
regard to most of my following contentions. Note, however, in the open institutional
fabric of liberal societies, total institutions are both distinctly atypical and particularly
closely hedged by legal and other safeguards.)6
The systematic deployment of this innovation, the freely adopted, deliberately created
role, is the correlate of the modern explosion of institutions. But why should this be
news to liberal theory? After all, the rise of contractual roles and relations is fundamental
to economic liberalism. Democratic institutions likewise presuppose that individuals
might be elected to or ejected from political roles, and that these roles might be
constitutionally altered. Not least, equality of opportunity or the ‘free choice of careers
and occupations’ (Rawls) would be meaningless without it. To clarify: My claim is not
the absurd one that liberalism has not relied on the emergence of institutions based on
such roles, and the other ‘technologies of organisation’ that these make possible. My
argument will rather be that it has failed to look at this development on its own terms,
and therefore not appreciated its importance in realising the actual achievements of
modern liberal polities.
I shall offer some suggestions in conclusion as to how this might have happened in
such a diverse and thoughtful body of political theory. But one way to give this claim
some prima facie plausibility might be to recall a recurring charge against liberalism. It
is often said, and not only by conservatives, that rights are correlate with responsibili-
ties.7 It is all very well, this line of thought may suggest, to emphasise liberal rights and
individual autonomy. But what assurance do we have that people will take care of their
responsibilities to one another? The greater the extent to which one endorses our
modern expectations, the harder it is to answer this doubt without hedging the indi-
vidual’s right to independently plan her own life.8 However, if one attends to the moral
achievements of the institutional fabric in which we live, I believe there is no impasse
here. The freedoms we have most reason to value do not include the freedom to ‘drop
out’; we will want to be able to leave behind particular associations if they prove
oppressive, but to be rid of all associations would be a deeply frightening prospect.
Most of the time, what matters is the freedom to participate in ways that are meaning-
ful by one’s own lights9 (and, we might add, compatible with the rights of others). The
moral tasks of our institutions, I will argue, can be summed up as opening such channels
for participation, and inculcating the responsibility that is both morally and practically its
necessary correlate. If this is correct, then our ‘freedom’ can indeed be squared with the
very weighty demands for responsibility that correspond to the very high expectations
that we have of our social order.
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To make this argument, I describe three moral tasks which institutions should, and
very often do, play. My task is thus both descriptive and normative. On the one hand,
I want to understand how it is that liberal polities are able to go so far in meeting our
considerable expectations of them. On the other, insofar as we admire and value those
achievements, to emphasise how they are made possible also has a prescriptive aspect.
If some of our institutions fail to perform these tasks, then that should be a matter of
moral and political concern. My discussion of these tasks will be relatively brief and
schematic: although we rarely, I suggest, take proper theoretical account of them, we
do tend to be very familiar with these tasks on a day-to-day level.
One final introductory note: Underpinning my argument is the following thought:
that normative liberal theory tends to overplay the significance of individual autonomy
and thus — something less often noticed — to underplay the costs and dangers of nor-
mative disagreement. It is this, I believe, that makes it plausible to neglect the structur-
ing power of social and economic, as well as political, institutions — a structuring that
is essential if individual autonomy is to be meaningfully and responsibly realised.
I believe that an emphasis upon the importance of our institutions still supports, in
every respectable sense of the word, a liberal vision — but it will be a liberalism better
grounded both in contemporary realities and in the enduring realities of our actual
moral agency.
Infrastructure (i): Inculcating Practical Moralities
The first task I will sketch concerns how institutions provide practical moralities for all
those they involve, and why this is itself of immense moral value. This does not involve
the claim that we all adopt all the values of the institutions we belong to, still less that
every institution or role embodies a defensible morality. It is rather to claim that
activity and its evaluation are thoroughly structured by roles and institutions, in ways
that are indeed morally important — and important not simply by virtue of the particu-
lar practical moralities concerned. This claim is meant to allow for there being cases
where this structuring takes place in undesirable ways — the danger of corrupt institu-
tions.10 But this possibility does not imply that structuring itself is unimportant —
rather that reform of roles or institutions, or both, would then be necessary, so that
activity and judgment are better structured.
 How do institutions provide us with practical moralities? The most important
aspects lie in their structuring of judgment and action via rules, roles and relation-
ships.11 In the first place, roles involve the acceptance of responsibility. Roles are usually
adopted with consent, which is vital not only from the point of view of individual
rights, but also because roles of any depth involve responsibilities whose fulfilment
cannot be effectively coerced, because they require the actor’s on-going thought, com-
mitment and initiative. The content of those responsibilities is, however, largely de-
fined by the role and the rules and expectations associated with it. In the institutional
context, moreover, we relate to others who have responsibilities for ensuring that we
understand these expectations. This is partly a case of constraining the actor to fulfil
them, but it is just as much a case of enabling him to fulfil them, through resources
such as authority and information. In an ideal world, and to some significant degree in
the real world of functioning liberal societies, roles combine incentives of self-interest,
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actors’ own moral expectations of themselves, and responsible contributions to others’
needs or legitimate aims.
 In these ways, many questions of human cooperation are pre-judged. Such
practical settlements are not open to contestation in the same way as the purportedly
‘shared values’ that theorists often suppose to be crucial for human cooperation. Even
when we agree on the ends, after all, dispute about the means can wreck everything.
Practically speaking, however, nothing succeeds like success: if all are able to see that
things are working, roles, rules, moralities do not need to be revisited or disputed. If
actors perceive fewer problems (whether at macro or micro levels) then they have
much less cause to fall in with the stories of blame and calls for punitive action that
help make normative disagreement so dangerous. (Thus the truism that intolerance
and scapegoating are much more prevalent in times of economic difficulty.) Mutual
trust and shared loyalty are secured, not primarily by shared ‘values’ or ‘identities,’ but
by the actual experience of successful and relatively fair cooperation.12
This may be granted, but there is still the question: why should the (provisional)
definition and enforcement of a relatively specific morality be of moral value, even
to some extent regardless of the content of that agreement? Is this not already to part
company with every liberal who wishes to stress the value of individual autonomy, of
exercising our own moral judgment? Two reasons are important.
In the first place, ‘getting it right’ is not the only value.13 Given the sheer complexity
and difficulty of human cooperation there is important value in agreement simply as
such. Any individual normative judgment has the potential to disturb practical agree-
ment, in ways that endanger trust, mutual loyalty, and cooperation. This is as true of
prudential and expertise-related judgments as it is of moral, religious, ideological and
identity-based ones. To acknowledge this is not to indulge in an illiberal yearning for
universal agreement. At this institutional, role-based level, what is at stake is a limited,
delimited and often provisional sort of agreement that liberals too can (and should)
value. Such a morality defines only one part of an individual’s life and conduct. By
their nature these practical moralities are exposed to a vital check, of not being in
significant conflict with the moralities involved in other spheres of a person’s life. And
such agreement should not be seen as merely constraining: in permitting certain sorts
of cooperation, it has a strong enabling aspect. Moreover, as I will stress in the next
section, such agreement represents a precondition for exercising individual initiative so
as to effect meaningful change.
Second, ‘getting it right’ is difficult and asks too much of us. In extremis we must
hope that people will fall back on some basic moral certainties (for example, not to
participate in organised murder). But we know people have often failed even in that.
We know (we should know) that individual moral reflection is extremely fragile; that
we are fundamentally dependent on social context for guidance; that most of us find it
impossible to live with norms that don’t vindicate our own conduct; that we need
values that lend meaning to our own lives. Values, like identities, are things we do;
and what we find ourselves doing shapes our values and alters our identities. We often
hear liberals (and communitarian critics) talking of values as if they might antecede,
or survive untouched by, our engagements with the institutions of modern societies.
When our values do change, this then appears as either a matter of manipulative,
autonomy-undermining influence or of rarefied, rational dialogue about those values.
But this is surely an unrealistic way of characterising individuals’ values and identities
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— and most unhelpful for understanding the processes by which they do become
sufficiently coordinated to provide for peaceful coexistence, mutual tolerance, and
active cooperation. I will say some more about this in discussing the multiplicity of our
affiliations, below.
Infrastructure (ii): Allocations of Responsibility, Initiative, Power
The first point concerned how institutions define agreed moralities, and the moral
importance of this agreement. I now wish to emphasise the differentiation that is
necessarily introduced by any institution, by virtue of the fact that it allocates different
responsibilities to distinct individuals. As well as creating nets of mutual expectations,
institutions create and adjudicate separate spheres of initiative.
One result of these processes is certainly familiar to liberalism, especially as
influenced by rational choice theory. One crucial role of institutions is to provide
solutions to coordination problems. It is no news that they can generate massive
coordination achievements — welfare, stability, mutual guarantees. In rational choice
approaches, the characteristic moral problems are taken to be those of ‘free-riding’ by
self-interested agents, and variations on the ‘tragedy of the commons’. Institutions
then enter the fray as means to promote coordination by providing mutual assurances
and altering incentive structures. Rational choice issues are obviously of moral as well
as prudential importance, if one agrees that cooperation represents an important value
in its own right. By limiting options for choice and thereby effectively shaping agents’
preferences, by creating patterns of reliable activity that mean one agent can count on
another, by providing resources to guarantee various sorts of ‘exchanges’: in all these
ways institutions are key.
But institutions’ coordinating powers have further moral dimensions, less often
appreciated. I would like to bring out two in particular: (i) How institutions provide
for a background or ‘working’ consensus against which disagreements can be dealt
with; (ii) How they separate powers and responsibilities, creating distinct spheres of
responsibility and initiative. These two aspects flow back and forth into each other: one
part of what gets accepted is who has responsibility or authority with regard to certain
choices; resolving many disagreements involves allocating or reallocating such powers.
In the first place, functional institutions are not simply stable but draw on their
members’ capacity to initiate change. Provisional agreement on ways of doing things
will incorporate some accepted ways of dealing with disagreement that do not disturb
on-going cooperation. Thus part of the shared morality discussed in the first section
concerns agreed ways of negotiating decision, change and disagreement. This means
that disagreements can be dealt with without the costs and dangers of unmanaged
conflict.14 Consider the example of a committee member. In normal circumstances —
where neither individual nor organisation is failing — she is neither simply ‘an indi-
vidual’ nor ‘one with’ the committee.15 She accepts that this is a forum for decision-
making, that she has a responsibility within it, that she has a right to contribute as well
as a duty as regards the collective decision, whether it represented her view or not.
This example might also remind us that roles are not just about rules. At the least
they involve interpreting those rules; at mid- and higher levels of responsibility, indi-
viduals are expected to respond creatively to their roles — to exercise both autonomy
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and responsibility. This initiative, coupled with the deliberate creation of roles, enables
institutions to be responsive to change or unmet responsibilities. Actors may renegoti-
ate their own role or that of others, create new roles, even found new institutions.
True as it is that institutions often blinker their members to unmet responsibilities, it is
equally the case that only organisations can provide for the stability and the organised
decision-making that are needed for deliberate change.
A further aspect of this first task lies in reducing and delimiting the need or demand
for moral(ised) discourse.16 I have already spoken of the importance of practical success
in reducing the need for individual judgment, in enabling practical agreement. In
relation to organisations’ divisions of responsibility, this is important inasmuch as we
feel less need to interfere in others’ areas of judgment and action.17 Being able to count
on others’ courses of action reduces the need for ‘contingency planning’ to an extent
that can hardly be overestimated. Experience and relevant expertise accumulate over
time, reducing one’s own and others’ uncertainty about one’s capacity to fulfil the role,
in turn reducing legitimate scope for interference and the scope and import of norma-
tive disagreement.
This brings us to a second moral dimension of institutions’ coordinating powers:
how practical agreement and effective cooperation are enabled by distributing respons-
ibilities among agents and between agencies. Institutions allocate spheres of respons-
ibility in a two-fold sense. Individuals are allocated particular responsibilities by their
organisations, while institutions themselves have their own tasks and concerns.
Within institutions, individuals are obviously allocated distinct spheres of responsibility.
This is morally important because responsibility is correlative with initiative and power.
Individuals are enabled, empowered and recognised, matters of great importance to
people’s sense of self and responsibility even when it concerns things which outsiders
might judge quite trivial. Individuals have some responsibility that is not identical to
anyone else’s, and ideally one that does not conflict severely with another’s. At the
same time, it is not a total responsibility. Others have responsibilities for other aspects
of the same matter. We have responsibilities to communicate, negotiate and inform.
Others check and hold accountable. For example, if we have particular responsibility
to provide for an incapacitated person’s health care, others have responsibilities as
regards their housing; and other have responsibilities for checking on the care we provide.
Responsibility that is overseen or borders on other responsibilities does not thereby
become nugatory; it does become more manageable, and its fulfilment more sure.
Perhaps even more important, separation of responsibilities means that the level of
reflection and responsibility demanded of any one individual is considerably reduced.
Some affairs, outcomes, issues aren’t one’s responsibility, having been assigned to
another agent or agency; and responsibility for many more issues is shared with others.
And this is crucial, because people who are over-loaded tend to drastically simplify
their sense of responsibility, both so that their tasks are made manageable and so that
they do not have to see themselves as failing in their duties. We know that the manager
who is expected to be responsible for safety as well as profit will too often forget about
safety. With a safety officer to check up on him, and a regulatory agency to control
safety standards, we can reasonably hope for a happier result.
As this example suggests, we divide responsibilities between, as well as within,
institutions. Politically speaking, of course, some institutions will have much more
important tasks than others. But this does not mean that we should attend only to
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those institutions of obvious political importance. One reason for this was emphasised
by classical liberals, when they stressed the importance of spheres of activity not
controlled by the state — thus the ‘free market’. Even if modern day liberals tend to be
less sanguine about markets and more optimistic about governmental activity, the basic
point remains important. We want to divide responsibilities, ensuring that there is
slack in the system, that different bodies can check one another, that individuals have
different places to turn (or run) to. While I find that many liberal theorists place more
weight on individual rights as a check to government and a means to social participa-
tion than they should, and less weight on plural organisations (a point that was brought
out in debates about civil society)18 the importance of divided powers rightly remains
an important liberal theme. Appropriately, openness, accountability and mutual
oversight are attracting renewed attention — especially as we find that some forms
of oversight are meddling and intrusive, and may undercut an organisation’s proper
initiative with regard to its responsibilities.19 But for all that such processes are rarely
straightforward and can go awry, mechanisms of accountability are crucial to the
openness of an institutional fabric, and to seeing that different organisations each
embody defensible moralities.
Some time ago Karl Popper described ‘piecemeal engineering’ as the basis of
the open society.20 ‘Institutional division of responsibility’ is both the condition and the
subject of such engineering. Sometimes, of course, responsibilities fall through the
cracks — especially for those who lack meaningful participation in the overall fabric of
our institutions, for instance those living outside the borders of liberal states. It was in
this context that Samuel Scheffler coined my title phrase, ‘infrastructures of respons-
ibility’ — how communities and institutional frameworks supply ‘individuals with a
reasonably clear statement of their responsibilities and encourage the development of
the motivations that will lead them to discharge those responsibilities’.21 A basic reality
of the modern world is that unmet responsibilities will not be addressed by individual
initiatives, except insofar as those initiatives combine to found or restructure institu-
tions.22 In turn, one crucial feature of the open society is that individuals and organisa-
tions are empowered to pick up and deal with unmet responsibilities.
In sum: our institutional fabric frames responsibility, power and initiative, for indi-
viduals and for organisations, providing a background of practical agreement that is the
sine qua non for fruitfully tackling disagreement. While enabling actors or organisa-
tions to fulfil certain duties, this fabric equally prevents them from disregarding their
responsibilities or pursuing others’ responsibilities. By offering, recognising, delimiting
channels to participate in the commonweal, institutions prevent us from being con-
fronted with a plethora of moral tasks with no idea who might tackle which, with
boundless responsibilities and a pernicious licence to interfere wherever we judge fit.
Thus Bradley’s dictum, ‘my station and its duties’: a dictum we should not scorn, but
only qualify by observing that in modern societies we create and renegotiate both
stations and duties as a matter of course.
Infrastructure (iii): Recognition and Identities
This is to argue that institutions embody working moral agreements that are them-
selves morally important, that they permit significant coordination achievements via
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their divisions of responsibility and systems of mutual oversight, that they provide both
for stability and deliberate change. I now wish to focus on a fact so far only alluded
to: that in a liberal polity, we each have a plurality of allegiances, being members of
several institutions and, indeed, other forms of association. Moreover, some of these
memberships, though not all, will reflect our own choices and ride on our continued
consent. The result is, we might say, practical training in moral pluralism, as we
negotiate identities and renegotiate affiliations in order to make sense of our multiple
commitments.23
We already saw one crucial way in which institutions, even the most mundane, are
important in recognising individuals — something that is surely a crucial condition for
the decent exercise of moral agency. Insofar as our institutional roles grant us some
sphere of responsibility, they recognise us as contributors to the projects with which
they are bound up.24 Likewise, we encounter others in distinct, relatively well-defined
capacities or relations, rather than simply as individuals as such. That is to say, we
meet others with a definite and restricted responsibility toward them, so that we are
oriented by specific sorts of concern for them and extend them a certain sort of
consideration or recognition — and do not try to compass their entire identity.
Of course, there are many roles where these elements fail. Some roles deny respect,
or even humiliate — as Avishai Margalit stressed in reformulating the liberal project as
that of ‘the decent society’.25 One can hardly deny that such misrecognition is common
enough in liberal states. It is well known, for instance, to many ‘clients’ of welfare state
institutions, or amongst many employees subject to bad management. (As these
examples may indicate, such nugatory recognition is often correlated with the denial of
individual scope for legitimate initiative.) Our most worthwhile roles accord respons-
ibilities, particular spheres of answerability, albeit rather limited ones with narrowly
defined scope to judge or interfere in others’ thought or conduct. And even where the
degree of initiative is vanishingly small, our roles may provide us with some sense of
solidarity with our peers, that is, their recognition of us — the saving grace of many
workplaces, for example.
The crucial point, however, is that — in a liberal institutional fabric — we belong to
a plurality of institutions, and can, to a varying extent, choose our affiliations. In this
case, it matters less if some affiliations cast us in somewhat humbling roles, so long as
we do not experience systematic humiliation (especially not the humiliation of me and
my kind at the hands of them, an obvious crystallising factor for sectarian conflict). To
have a sense of ourselves as responsible agents, as persons who can be trusted and
whose judgment others can rely on, hardly requires thorough-going recognition in all
spheres of life. If we move amid a plurality of affiliations, having some say in those we
adopt, and if the institutions we have no choice about are not systematically humiliat-
ing, then we can expect the respect and recognition so important for responsible
agency. Equally, our interactions are structured in ways that lead us to recognise others
as fellow participants in many different spheres of life.
The multiplicity of affiliation and absence of group-based humiliations is especially
important when we think of the exclusionary, centrifugal dangers of identity and
group-based politics. It is an old point, recently less emphasised, that multiple loyalties
are crucial for toleration, for coexistence amid difference. They make it much more
difficult to maintain, and much less tempting to reach for, that most dangerous illu-
sion: that one possesses some well-formed idea of ‘the good’. They represent, as I have
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put it, practical training in moral pluralism: they expose us to competing loyalties, to
a diverse set of duties that are — so far as we indeed live among the institutions
schematised here — not ‘irreconcilable’ but rather in tension, in need of being kept
separate, and partial by their very nature. That is to say, in the idiom of one important
set of institutions: these duties may be weighty, but characteristically they are ‘just a
job,’ not an overriding existential imperative.
One objection often faced by liberals in debates about multiculturalism is that they
would relegate ‘difference’ to the private sphere. It may be thought that my account is
vulnerable to this objection too. It would not be unreasonable to interpret an emphasis
on roles and institutions as suggesting the following picture: That we appear to each
other in various impersonal capacities in our institutions, and that we enjoy more limited
associations with those who we share a sense of ‘community’ — families, religious
bodies, et cetera. In part I would want to concede the charge, with the claim that there
can be positive value in privatising difference. If we won’t agree about some things,
then let’s keep them to areas where we won’t fall over each other, so far as that proves
acceptable and practicable. This is to claim that there is no disvalue in modus vivendi
solutions; part of my line of thought, indeed, is that it is wrong-headed to draw any
strong line between ‘principled’ political settlements and ‘expedient’ social arrange-
ments.26 Both have costs and benefits, and pose their own risks when pursued or obtained;
both involve negotiations and areas of silence; both, in any case, act on people’s values
and identities because, as I have wanted to stress, these are things we do.
Nonetheless, none of the solutions multiculturalists have propounded are closed to
an account that emphasises the importance of our institutional affiliations. The key
proviso is only that our theorising does not hypostatise identities or communities into
some unitary, authentic moral whole. The language of competing ‘conceptions of the
good’ seems to me to do precisely this.27 Sectarians and bigots may think they have a
‘conception of the good,’ as may someone in the grip of a particular theoretical worldview
(some formulations of both liberalism and communitarianism, for instance). But decent
people in decent circumstances muddle through, compromising between the different
things they feel reason to value. And part of ‘muddling through’ consists in appearing
to each other in different aspects in the different contexts we move between. Many
modern ways of speaking imply that our different roles, or the presentation of different
aspects of ourselves to different audiences, involve some ‘inauthentic persona’ or a
falsification of a ‘real self ’, that compromises some pre-existing identity or our ‘auto-
nomy’. But this ignores how essential our various roles are to our self-conceptions, to
what sense of ‘identity’ we do have. It takes too little account of the political processes
of fear and mistrust by which people can be led to stake totalising identity claims,
where before there was effective coexistence.28 Not least, it spells doom for successful
co-existence should we fail to find sufficient ‘overlap’ in our various ‘conceptions of the
good’.
We might interpret, then, an effective plurality of institutions, which channels plural
forms of mutual recognition, as the effective realisation of norms of toleration. In the
working liberal polity we could reconstrue Rawls’s figure of ‘overlapping consensus’
thus: a huge set of diverse, interacting and mutually reinforcing ‘mini-consensuses’
between individuals who recognise each other — and identify themselves — in terms of
a variety of different capacities and roles. The individuals involved may see the overall
settlement in many different terms; most of them, in all probability, will give it hardly
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a second thought. It is one of the great achievements of liberalism, indeed, that they
have no need to reflect on this settlement, having already been enabled to get on with
their lives and fulfil their responsibilities to one another.
Conclusion
Liberalism is notoriously difficult to define and continues to be theorised by many
major thinkers in diverse ways. It is certain that the moral tasks and concerns raised
here are at least partly addressed by this body of thought. This suggests a prima facie
implausibility to my overall argument. Perhaps I should have asked sooner: what reason
could there be for thinking that such a wide-ranging and important theoretical school
suffers from this alleged institutional blind spot? I think a series of factors may explain
theorists’ relative neglect of the structuring role of institutions, social and economic as
well as political.
First, a certain ideational bias, for want of a better term: a tendency to focus on people’s
explicitly held beliefs and values, rather than their actual practices and contexts of
action. This may be what is called a ‘professional deformation’: as theorists our stock
in trade is concepts, values, justifications. It is all too easy to write in ways which suggest
a greater role for these than they play in everyday life, or which disembody them,
picturing a layer of reflection or self-conceptions above the material, mundane level of
‘self-interest’. In real life discussions, however, we know that values and practices are
incredibly hard to disentangle, and that explicitly moral discussion is as often a recipe
for self-deception and polarisation as it is for constructive debate.
This relates, second, to a tendency among many liberals to be too optimistic about
the normative disagreement, and its risks and costs — despite liberalism’s important
emphasis on the coexistence of different ways of life. As some advocates of ‘modus vivendi’
and ‘liberalism of fear’ approaches have argued, the picture tends to be of people
arguing about ‘alternative conceptions of the good’ or ‘the nature of the good life’. But
our experience of the ‘fact of pluralism’ is, especially outside of liberal polities, much
more mixed than this — in large part, because the ‘good lives’ concerned are crucial to
the meaningfulness of people’s lived experiences.29 If that meaningfulness is felt to be
under threat, then ‘difference’ becomes exceedingly dangerous.
A third factor one might mention is a sort of ‘legalism’ that ascribes an unrealistic
sovereignty to the state and its laws, and neglects the crucial role of actual practices
and institutions in constituting a social and political order. One interesting version of
this charge owes to Foucault and theorists of ‘governmentality,’ such as Nikolas Rose.
Rose observes: ‘Liberal government, dependent as it is upon the orchestrations of
the actions of independent entities, is inherently risky — and no more so than in its
reliance upon those who are able to mobilise around the power to speak the truth and
the capacity to act knowledgeably upon conduct’.30 To be sure, this does sound like
an immensely fragile balancing act, much more complex than the simplified ‘state
guarantees rights’ story that we often assume. But a different slant might be put on the
matter, if we think of the multiply interlinked web of agents and agencies pictured
here. Given the variety and extent of the expertise that is thereby coordinated and
enlisted, the multiple sources of power that check and balance, the willingness to take
responsibility that are brought together, one may think that we have discovered a
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particularly powerful and enabling form of government. And the evidence surely speaks
to this side of the story, too.
Finally, and most obviously: no one can forget the danger of corrupt institutions.
Not just the greatest benefits but also, with the partial and important exception of civil
conflict, the greatest harms have been institutionalised. When we think of mass murder,
for example, we inevitably picture Eichmann, archetype of organisation man amid evil
organisations. More mundanely, we might think of testimony from those who have ‘blown
the whistle’ on corporate or bureaucratic or military wrongdoing. Here we certainly
want to stress the importance of individual moral reflection, and disavow the immoral
power of institutions.31 The question, however, is what this disavowal should mean in
practice. The reality is that few do speak out; more, in the case of a corrupt institu-
tional fabric, speaking out is almost certainly useless. What is most important, I would
suggest, is a relative openness to our institutions. An emphasis on the moral value of
institutions only neglects the dangers of corrupt institutions if it ignores the importance
of this openness.
Now, the openness of our institutions is clearly a huge topic in its own right; indeed,
recalling Popper’s ‘open society’, one might frame the whole liberal project in such
terms. But it may be useful to point up how important this has been to my descriptive-
cum-normative account. Above all, openness involves checks between institutions,
checks that are mutual and overlapping and rarely straightforwardly hierarchical.
Responsibilities and the exercise of these responsibilities are made matters of scrutiny,
of formal and informal accountability. Thus responsibilities breached or neglected can
be challenged, addressed, taken up. As well as rights to found new associations, this
relies on real and effective opportunities to speak out with regard to organisations’
activities and their goals. Likewise, we are familiar with the importance of real and
effective options for exit, which exist for many of the associations and institutions to
which we belong. Of course, this is not always feasible, political membership being the
most obvious example. In such a case, it is natural to think that the institution must
meet rather higher standards to be legitimate. Corporations can severely restrict their
members’ knowledge of and participation in many aspects of their running, and both
workers and customers should (at least) be able to leave. States, on the other hand, are
rightly constrained by formal democratic rights and institutions dedicated to monitor-
ing and protecting these.
We can sum up openness, then, in the terms so nicely contrasted by Hirschman.32
For each organisational affiliation, our loyalty is conditional; there exists scope for
voice; usually exit will also be an option. Abilities to contribute, to speak out, and to
leave provide a vital check on the internal moralities of organisations; without them,
the hope that we can find a productive tension — and not outright contradictions —
between the moralities of our various memberships becomes merely pious. In each
case, however, note that other organisations enable our rights to contribute, to speak
out, to leave.
All these points and more have received great thought and attention, if not always by
liberal theorists, then certainly by all those caught up in the unending work of institut-
ing a liberal social fabric. Against the emphasis of liberal theorists, I want only to stress
that, to prevent corrupt institutions, and the corrupt individual moralities that result, our
solutions must be themselves institutional, first and foremost. The worse things are,
the more we will want the sort of responsible moral judgment that liberalism typically
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values so highly — and the less likely we are to get it. Amid the comforts of our
functioning institutions, it is all too easy to forget that responsible agency is very largely
an achievement of those same institutions.
To conclude: I suggest this view of institutions and the problems they help us to
solve is congruent with concerns that lead liberals to emphasise values such as tolera-
tion or neutrality, autonomy or individual rights. But it is based on the belief that these
values are much less matters of discursive or theoretical agreement than of institution-
alised practice. What really counts is not how people talk about the right or the good,
but practical mechanisms which structure how they experience and fulfil their respons-
ibilities to one another. Within an open institutional fabric people pursue neither
supposedly coherent conceptions of the good, nor unjustly compelled compromises
of such conceptions, more likely to build up resentments than to foster coexistence.
These people won’t agree about many of the things they choose to reflect on, and they
won’t need to reflect on many other things besides. And all this seems to me just as
well, if we keep in mind that the costs of unstructured participation, uninformed
debate, and unmediated disagreement can be very grave indeed.
Garrath Williams, Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy, Lancaster University, Lancaster
LA1 4YG, UK. g.d.williams@lancaster.ac.uk
Acknowledgements
For comments and discussions on this paper, I would like to thank Bob Brecher,
Margaret Canovan, Tim Chappell, Eve Garrard, Morris Kaplan, colleagues at Lancas-
ter University (especially John O’Neill and Alan Holland), Mairi Levitt, and partici-
pants at the Northern Political Theory Association’s conference at the University of
Edinburgh, August 2002. My thanks, too, to the referees of this journal.
NOTES
1 Another important suggestion one might make regards nations and nationalism, an idea explored by
Margaret Canovan in Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996). She suggests
that the achievements of liberalism have depended, much more than liberal theorists usually allow, upon
the resources of nationhood: ‘the discourses of liberalism, social justice and democratic theory rely upon
tacit assumptions about the existence of political community’ (p. 44), especially the mobilisations of power
that nationhood makes possible. My argument intersects with hers for those cases where nations are
constituted as states, i.e. as a set of mutually checking and mutually enabling institutions, which do indeed
mobilise power to an extraordinary degree.
2 For my purposes, no particular distinction is made between ‘institutions’ and ‘organisations.’ This usage
therefore excludes one sociological use of the term, when a settled practice such as promising or marriage
is described as an institution.
3 G. Vickers, Making Institutions Work (London: Associated Business Programmes, 1973), pp. 11, 13.
4 One obvious exception is Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism and Equality (New York:
Basic Books, 1983). However, Walzer’s argument concerns the particular roles played by different sorts of
institutions, whereas I am concerned with the common tasks fulfilled by all the institutions that co-exist in
a liberal polity. Our arguments do, however, overlap considerably when it comes to the importance of a
plurality of institutions, each with their own proper sphere that needs to be continually negotiated against
the boundaries of others. Cf. also Charles Taylor, ‘Atomism’ in his Philosophy and the Human Sciences:
Philosophical Papers 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 205ff.
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5 Vickers op. cit., p. 29.
6 I speak of an ‘open institutional fabric’ because I do not wish to imply that liberalism demands openness
of all institutions, even allowing for the exception of prisons, asylums and so on. Many organisations are
closed in the sense that their membership is limited by religion, sexuality, geography and so on, something
no liberal need disapprove of. On ‘openness’ see further my conclusion, below.
7 Among contemporary political theorists this basic point has been strongly pursued by Onora O’Neill, for
instance Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). O’Neill also argues
that we need to accord an important role to institutions in defining duties and realising rights. See also my
review article ‘Understanding the wrongs we do together’, Res Publica 8 (2002).
8 One plausible way out of this problem might be found in incentive structures that reward those
who contribute most to the stock of goods, services, and powers that will enable us to provide decent
opportunities to all. My reservation here lies in the presupposition that incentives can be clearly separated
from the values of those who pursue them, i.e. the idea that an incentive structure is not problematic from
a liberal point of view, because it is does not make assumptions about people’s moral values, or interfere
with their moral autonomy. But people prefer to pursue incentives they think are worthwhile — and if they
are made to pursue non-worthwhile incentives, often come to alter their ideas of what is worthwhile. That
is, we seem inevitably to link the idea of reward with desert. From my perspective, this is not problematic
in itself (everything would hinge on the detailed workings of the incentive structure). But it is difficult to
see how it could fit with a commitment to neutrality or to an autonomy-based perfectionism, to name two
prominent strands of contemporary liberal theory.
9 I will say some more below, about the fact that our modes of valuing are reflexively related to our
affiliations and activities — so that our moral preferences are to some extent ‘adaptive’.
10 Obviously, there are many cases where agreement enables harms and wrongs to be organised, from the
Mafia’s code of silence to the Catholic bishops who sought to avoid scandal by shielding paedophile
priests. (I thank Margaret Canovan for these examples and pressing this point.) My argument might be
put this way: institutionalised agreement is a sine qua non of fruitful human coexistence, as it is for
constructively tackling disagreements; so too, it can also permit and foster great harms. On the other hand,
sheer disagreement can only generate harms and costs. My conclusion points to some ways in which the
openness of a liberal institutional fabric limits the dangers of corrupt institutions.
11 Thus Dorothy Emmet’s valuable study, Rules, Roles and Relations (London: Macmillan, 1966).
12 Claus Offe nicely summarises the dual aspect of functional fitness and normative attachment, drawing on
extensive literature in social theory: ‘Designing institutions in East European transitions’, in R. Goodin
(ed.) The Theory of Institutional Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
13 Cheshire Calhoun usefully stresses that ‘getting it right’ is not the only moral goal, and that we must also
aim at ‘mutual agreement to a scheme of social cooperation’ — which, as she says, goes against the usual
assumptions of moral philosophers: ‘Moral failure’, in C. Card (ed.) On Feminist Ethics and Politics
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1999), p. 93.
14 Russell Hardin (1996) incorporates a strong sense of the idiosyncrasy and damaging variability in norma-
tive judgment into his case for going beyond individual or ad hoc to ‘institutional morality’ (in an essay of
that name, in Goodin (ed.), op. cit.: esp. 141ff. Dennis Thompson also makes such a case: ‘The institu-
tional turn in professional ethics’, Ethics and Behaviour 9 (1999).
15 I thank Bob Brecher for the example and this way of putting it.
16 Cf. Robert Goodin, one liberal thinker who has taken institutions very seriously. Goodin defends his claim
that ‘acting upon moral principles usually works out to the good’ by saying that opponents of this claim
have in mind moralising (inflexible, intolerant), not ‘moral,’ approaches to politics: Motivating Political
Morality (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 165ff. I should prefer to say that, so far as this nice
distinction has any practical purchase, this hangs on institutional frameworks that successfully channel and
delimit normative claims.
17 Of course, there is an important question here about the accuracy of our perceptions: if inaccurate, we
may face needless contention or succumb to misplaced complacency.
18 What exactly ‘civil society’ covers has been much disputed: it is now usually taken to be that sphere of
association outside of state and market, and sometimes even the subset of these associations that is not
formally instituted. Being concerned with the roles performed by all the coexisting institutions in a liberal
polity, I leave this definitional issue aside.
19 Onora O’Neill’s recent work is especially notable: e.g. A Question of Trust (BBC Reith lectures, 2002,
www.bbc.co.uk/radio4).
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20 K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies: Vol. 1: The Spell of Plato 3rd edn. (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1957), p. 157 and passim.
21 S. Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 125.
22 Onora O’Neill has particularly stressed this point. In the international context, see O. O’Neill, Bounds of
Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). See also David Miller, ‘Distributing respons-
ibilities’, Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2001).
23 For an important recent discussion of this topic, see Nancy Rosenblum, Membership and Morals: The
Personal Uses of Pluralism in America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Rosenblum valu-
ably brings out how complex and variegated the experience and effects of associations can be, arguing that
we should attach particular importance to the openness and shifting nature of associational life.
24 At the same time institutions also largely define the criteria by which agents compete for more elevated
status. Instead of agents who feel bound to assert themselves ‘through the external manifestations of
success . . . [that] are without limit’: Hegel, Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet, ed. A. W. Wood
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, [1821] 1991) §253, remark), ‘institutionalised’ agents operate
with narrower, intersubjective criteria of status achievement.
25 A. Margalit, The Decent Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
26 Cf. J. T. Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
27 A way of talking that (e.g.) Rawls is quite happy to adopt, despite his most sensible statement toward
the end of A Theory of Justice: ‘Human good is heterogeneous because the aims of the self are hetero-
geneous. Although to subordinate all our aims to one end does not strictly speaking violate the principles
of rational choice . . . it still strikes us as irrational, or more likely as mad. The self is disfigured and put
in the service of one of its ends for the sake of system’, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) p. 554.
All I would add is that such a move is unlikely to be made merely ‘for the sake of system,’ but rather
to defend oneself against complexities and uncertainties that one’s situation has rendered acute or even
overwhelming.
28 Cf. Michael Ignatieff, The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience (London: Chatto &
Windus, 1998).
29 The phrases in quotes are taken from Patrick Neal, ‘Vulgar liberalism’, Political Theory 21 (1993): 635,
and our arguments overlap considerably.
30 N. Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
p. 51.
31 We can see this power as the dark side of the three tasks I have emphasised: (i) The agreement in practical
moralities might be coerced or involve corrupt moralities, and most likely both. (ii) The allocation of
responsibilities might be systematically muddled or obscured; members might be thoroughly disempowered,
their ability to fulfil their responsibilities systematically undermined. (iii) It might happen that practical
pluralism is either eliminated, when one institution becomes hegemonic, or rendered unbearable, as when
institutions demand activities that systematically contradict the values involved in other spheres of life.
32 A. O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
